

Implementation in Action:  
IAP's Experience in Engaging Scientists in Biosecurity  
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## **Effective Practices in Addressing Bio-Risks in the Area of Research & Development: A Perspective from MENA Region.**

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## Introduction



### **Biological Threats**

- For the past decade, governments seeking biological *security* have trained personnel and secured pathogens and laboratories at home and abroad; internationally they have often included biological *safety* training to help make the *security* 'medicine go down'.
- Some have lumped biosafety and biosecurity activities under the concept of "*Biorisk Management*".

## ***Biorisk Management***

- To manage biological risks, there is a need to:
  - promote a “*culture of responsibility in the life sciences*”,
  - introduce effective oversight measures, *biosafety and biosecurity training programs*, and voluntary or mandatory *guidelines* to ensure that powerful biotechnologies such as synthetic biology are employed in a safe and secure manner, and
  - devise prudent measures to prevent misuse without impeding legitimate research or curtailing beneficial applications.

## ***Biological Threats***

- Much of the training and many of the upgrades to labs have been helpful in making workplaces safer; some of the activities may have enhanced security.
- Hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent globally but in many cases, neither the real increase in *security* nor the *sustainability* of the upgrades or training is known.



### ***The Dynamic Nature of Biological Threats***

- Security in biology differs from that in a nuclear or chemical enterprise:
  - The biological materials are ubiquitous in nature; for some, invisible quantities could initiate an outbreak or epidemic.
  - Real-time tools to identify or quantify the microbes or to know they are passing through our transportation systems are lacking.
  - Many biological experts exist in nearly every country around the globe.



### ***The Dynamic Nature of Biological Threats***

- There is a huge global disparity in resources available for the life sciences and public health enterprise, let alone resources dedicated to securing it.
  - There are regions of the globe where gathering food and firewood for the day is a fulltime job. Even a simple security fence built around a laboratory in those regions might not be sustainable. In such places, concerns about deliberate misuse truly pale in the face of the daily and life-long fight for survival from malaria, AIDS, tuberculosis and parasitism.
  - In other regions where agricultural economies exist, the relevant fight may be to control plant and animal pests and pathogens.



### ***The Dynamic Nature of Biological Threats***

- In yet other places, wealthy communities have the luxury of being concerned about production of industrial materials, energy generated from biotechnologies, or even environmental preservation.
- Safety and security perceptions and needs vary across all of these settings, as does *sustainability* of the programs put in place to implement them.
- Every region of the world is different; significant diversity also exists within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region



### ***The Dynamic Nature of Biological Threats***

- Until recently, the MENA region was a low priority for funding.
- The increased socio-political turbulence in the region during the last several years has driven a heightened awareness globally of its implications for safety and security.
- A small group of leaders of the biological sciences community in the MENA region has recently been discussing the way ahead for a safe, secure and sustainable life sciences enterprise.

## ***The Start,,,***

- For years, global aid programs focused on public health: malaria, soil and water parasitism, tuberculosis, insect borne viruses and later HIV-AIDS.
  - Many of these legitimate public health programs had the additional virtue of building trust between individuals and nations.
- After the anthrax attacks of 2001 priorities changed.
  - First, governments enacted new security-motivated laws domestically.
  - Soon thereafter, they began introducing security and safety programs internationally, most notably in countries considered threats or potential sources of microbial materials for biological terrorism; such efforts were eventually undertaken in the MENA region.

## ***What is Needed?***

- Many of the domestic and international improvements have been positive, particularly when they didn't impede the local life-sciences enterprise or slow collaboration more than they contributed to security.
- That balance isn't always easy and not all of the efforts have continued, particularly when an outside country introduced their own model of biosafety and biosecurity to another.
- To achieve *sustainability*, new policies, procedures and activities must be *affordable* and *effective*, after a benefactor is gone, and individuals, organizations and governments must appreciate the real value of the new programs.
  - ***In short, the programs must be practical and affordable.***

## ***What is Needed?***

- Even when recipients take possession of the ideas, technologies and training, some new programs have proven of limited utility if not *integrated* into the local life-sciences enterprises.
  - Programs have failed sometimes because the model was inappropriate for the **resource base of the region** or because it seemed **unimportant in the local environment**. Examples of resource imbalance include
    - unreliable electricity,
    - interrupted Internet access,
    - lack of funds to maintain state-of-the-art facilities or equipment,
    - lack of trained staff, and
    - lack of awareness by and support from governments.

## ***The Way Forward,,,***

- Any program, to be effective, must be built on a framework appropriate for the goals of the enterprise and the region.
- Depending to a great extent on the resources and political climate, the framework on which a life sciences enterprise is built will include, to varying degrees;
  - human resources,
  - technologies,
  - finance,
  - patent law,
  - marketing,
  - management, **AND**
  - *safety* and *security* programs tailored to the **needs** of the enterprise and the country.



### ***Measures to Advance Biosafety and Biosecurity***

- The most successful research or applied health programs typically have excellent *leadership* that possesses *authority* commensurate with *responsibility*.
- The best laboratory leaders bring with them strategy, vision, honesty, ethics, a collaborative spirit and an appreciation and support for the integration of appropriate safety and security principles and programs into the everyday research or clinical environment.
  - *Ethics education* is currently being used locally in parts of the region to help students and practicing scientists with this integration.



### ***Measures to Advance Biosafety and Biosecurity***

- At the laboratory level, this integration of principles into the thinking of a large network of clinical laboratories is described as the “**3Cs of Biosecurity**”: *Codes of Ethics, Codes of Conduct* and *Codes of Practice*.
- These terms serve as mental ‘hooks’ onto which scientists and researchers can hang principles related to responsible individual and corporate practice;
  - *principles that eventually form a protective matrix across and throughout the enterprise and country.*

### ***Measures to Advance Biosafety and Biosecurity***

- Enlightened leaders also bring their own sense of personal responsibility regarding science and technology.
  - When such leaders are given the opportunity to ‘lead’, organizations develop a culture of quality, value, loyalty, partnering, innovation, growth... and corporate responsibility.
  - *Communities of trust* spring from such organizations and global networks result when scientist-to-scientist relationships of trust develop between the communities.

### ***Measures to Advance Biosafety and Biosecurity***


- The real purpose of the enterprise is not *safety* or *security*; it might be public health, food production, energy, agriculture or environmental protection... *all for the good of the populations of the region in which the enterprise exists.*
- The finance, the technology or the management are all critical components in the enterprise but not meant to stand-alone either; they must be part of a system, as they are not *sustainable* outside the system.
- *In the MENA region sustainability of biosafety and biosecurity programs is not achievable without careful integration and high-level management support.*



## The Soup Recipe,,,

- Therefore, we believe it's time to move beyond '**check-box engagements**', characterized by meetings, lectures, certifications and training programs to *integrated systems approaches* where right-sized, relevant biosafety and biosecurity capabilities and knowledge are an important component.
  - Having regulations, a fence around the laboratory and a certificate on the wall is not enough; and a too heavy security overlay may even run counter to the intended purpose.
  - Safety and security are only as good as the *culture* of an organization.
  - The culture is only as healthy as the people and the *leadership*.
- A *holistic approach* is required within each country, the region and within the assistance programs. *Only when safety and security become ingredients in the life sciences enterprise 'soup' will they be both effective and sustainable (Figure 1).*

**Figure 1: The "Soup Slide" developed spontaneously during discussion at the MENA region meetings.**



## Conclusions

- We have learned to titrate *safety* precautions and practices to the risk; we can also measure their benefits.
- Biological *security* incidents are very rare but have potential for great harm.
- We can measure the security activities, but not their effectiveness.
- We will never remove all the risk, but working together globally we can make the most of *safety*, *security* and *productivity* when we all realize that biosafety and biosecurity programs are only really effective when they are thoroughly mixed as ***“immune enhancing vegetables into the life sciences soup”***.

## Main Reference

- *Paths to Biosafety and Biosecurity Sustainability: A Message from the MENA Region.* By Anwar Nasim, Nisreen DaifAllah AL-Hmoud, Sabah Al Momin, Najat Rashid, Khalid R. Tamsamani, Kavita Berger, David R. Franz. AAAS Science and Diplomacy. November, 2013



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Thank  
You

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